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THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL AS A “FRIEND OF THE
COURT” IN EDUCATION CASES
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This article applies a deliberative democracy framework to examine the American
Legislative Exchange Council’s (ALEC) efforts to influence education policy. Specifically, we
examine “friend of the court” briefs submitted in significant education cases. This exploratory
study examines four major education cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. Cases address
topics such as school choice, teachers unions and funding for English Learners. Findings reveal
variance in the way the organization presents itself and its interests to the court. The analysis
illustrates that this aspect of ALEC’s work undermines both the procedural and substantive
elements of deliberative democracy.
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INTRODUCTION

Public education is the product of our system of democratic policy-making at all levels
of government. All schools operate in the context of education law and policy. Though the federal
government adopts educational policy, state educational policy largely drives the delivery of
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education in the United States. 1 State-level policies determine how public schools are organized,
funded, and operated. 2 State policies also define whether and under what circumstances charter
schools exist, 3 and whether public funds are allocated to support private education. 4
As representative democracies, all state governments provide a means for its citizens to
elect their neighbors to represent their interests as policies are debated, written, revised, and
retired. This democratic process presupposes that all citizens have access to their elected
representatives and can affect policies by engaging in the political process.
In addition to legislation, judicial pronouncements in the form of case law also provide a
significant source of legal authority for schools. Litigation both provides a check on policies that
exceed federal and state constitutional boundaries and construes how statutes should apply to a
given situation and set of facts. 5 Plaintiffs challenge policies and defendants mount arguments to
withstand those challenges. But it is not only the parties to a lawsuit that may try to influence the
outcome of a judicial proceeding. Interested individuals and entities who are not parties to the
litigation may file arguments in the form of amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) briefs in an
attempt to sway judicial opinion. 6 In this way, even courts are connected to the democratic
political process.
Any entity that wishes to significantly affect education policy must therefore attend to
both legislation and litigation. One such player is the influential American Legislative Exchange
Council (“ALEC”). 7 Despite operating largely outside the public eye for much of its existence,
ALEC has gained increasing attention over the past few years. 8 ALEC aims to “advance the
fundamental principles of free-market enterprise, limited government, and federalism” 9 through
its efforts to change the law in a number of areas that impact Americans daily. Education is a
particular target of ALEC’s influence. While some literature has discussed ALEC’s approach to
influencing state-level legislation through the adoption and dissemination of model education
policies, 10 this article examines a lesser known approach the organization uses to shape education
1

See generally, e.g., Kern Alexander & M. David Alexander, American Public School Law (2011); Julie F.
Mead, The Role of Law in Education Policy Formation, Implementation, and Research in Handbook of Education Policy
Research, 286, 291 (Gary Sykes, Barbara Schneider & David N. Plank, eds., 2009).
2

See generally Alexander & Alexander, supra note 1; Mead, supra note 1.

3

Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School Statutes that Blur the
Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION 349, 350 (2003).
4

Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling: Examining Voucher
Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 703, 713-714 (2015).
5

Mead, supra note 1, at 292-95.

6

Sup. Ct. R. 37.

7

See generally American Legislative Exchange Council (2017), https://www.alec.org/ [https://perma.cc/

4SX9-EYEB].
8

See, e.g., ALEC Exposed, The Center for Media and Democracy (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.

alecexposed.org/wiki/ALEC_Exposed [https://perma.cc/4DFV-7G8S].
9

Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08294), 2009 WL 526204.
10

Gary L. Anderson & Liliana Montoro Donchik, Privatizing Schooling and Policy Making: The American
Legislative Exchange Council and New Political and Discursive Strategies of Education Governance, 30 EDUC. POLICY
322, 323 (2014). See also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1104 (2014); Anthony S.
Kammer, Privatizing the Safeguards of Federalism, 29 J. Law & Pol. 69, 120 (2013); Julie Underwood & Julie F. Mead, A
Smart ALEC Threatens Public Education, 93(6) PHI DELTA KAPPAN J. 51, 51-52 (2012).
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law and policy: ALEC’s attempts to influence judicial deliberations of education policy disputes
through the filing of amicus curiae briefs. Accordingly, this article investigates the frequency of
ALEC’s role as an amicus, the educational disputes for which the organization weighed in, and
the relationship between ALEC’s arguments and the ruling in the case.
The first section of the article examines ALEC and reviews research about its influence
on educational policy. Since this study examines ALEC’s participation in the judicial sphere, the
next section provides a review of literature concerning amicus curiae briefs and courts’ use of
them. Finally, the results of this first-of-its-kind investigation into ALEC’s role as a “friend of the
court” are shared and discussed in relation to the implications for the democratic process for
setting educational policy.
I.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Before presenting ALEC’s activity in education case law, it is first necessary to review
two important strands of literature: 1) scholarly discussions of ALEC and its interest in education,
and 2) scholarship on the use and impact of amicus curiae briefs.
A. American Legislative Exchange Council

In operation since 1973, the American Legislative Exchange Council is a non-profit
organization that seeks to protect free-market policies while limiting the size of the federal
government. On its website, ALEC states that it is “America’s largest nonpartisan, voluntary
membership organization of state legislators dedicated to the principles of limited government,
free markets and federalism.” 11 ALEC’s members include over 2,000 state legislators, as well as
corporations, foundations, and think-tanks, thereby providing opportunities for lawmakers to
collaborate with business leaders as they design model legislation, press briefings, and policy
agendas for state and federal government. 12 Much of this work is conducted through ALEC’s ten
task forces, each addressing a specific field such as education and workforce development, tax
and fiscal policy, and civil justice. 13 The task forces are jointly led by a lawmaker and a corporate
leader, ensuring collaboration between the government and corporate membership of the
organization. 14 ALEC’s impact is significant, with the organization claiming responsibility for
20% of all legislative bills passed in recent years, including privatization of prisons and
immigrant detention facilities, online charter schools, reduction of environmental protections, and
“Stand Your Ground” gun laws. 15
Although ALEC has extensive reach and influence on state and federal policymaking,
11

About ALEC, American Legislative Exchange Council (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.alec.org/about,
www.alec.org/about [https://perma.cc/V97F-AFG5].
12

See American Legislative Exchange Council, supra note 7; See also Underwood & Mead, supra note 10.

13

See Task Forces, American Legislative Exchange Council (Jan. 24, 2017), www.alec.org/task-force/
[https://perma.cc/5TV4-EUQN].
14
Andrew Ujifusa, Controversial Policy Group Casts Long K-12 Shadow, Education Week (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2012/04/20/29alec_ep.h31.html [https://perma.cc/3VQP-6Y5T]; Underwood & Mead,
supra note 10, at 52.
15

Anderson & Donchik, supra note 10, at 343; see also ALEC (1998), Common Cause,
http://www.commoncause.org/issues/more-democracy-reforms/alec/ [https://perma.cc/E47Y-GYRU]; Kammer, supra
note 10, at 123; Mary Whisner, There Oughta be a Law-A Model Law, 106 LAW LIB. J. 125, 133 (2014).
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relatively few publications – from either mainstream media or peer-reviewed journals – have been
published about the organization. 16 The group has had a legacy of extreme privacy for much of its
tenure, enabling it to operate largely in secret until a 2012 whistle-blower complaint by Common
Cause alleged that the organization lobbied lawmakers in violation of the rules associated with its
status as a non-profit organization. 17 Though a Minnesota ethics board ultimately ruled in favor of
ALEC, 18 the complaint apparently prompted the organization to release large numbers of
documents and begin publishing its model bills on its website. 19 Since then, ALEC has lost some
corporate sponsorship, yet remains actively engaged in the political arena. 20
Within the educational context, ALEC plays a substantial role by creating model bills
that are then proposed by state legislators, often in their entirety and without attribution to the
organization. 21 ALEC’s model bills promote a neoliberal model of education that prioritizes
privatization of nearly all aspects of public schooling in the United States. 22 ALEC’s model bills
promote privatization of schools through charters, vouchers, and parent trigger laws; privatization
of student data collection; expanding standardized testing; reducing the power of teacher unions;
and increasingly privatizing the teaching workforce. 23
As of June 30, 2016, ALEC’s website made available a total of 58 model bills related to
education. 24 Table 1 lists each model bill by title and categorizes them by topic. Consistent with
Dannin’s 25 earlier findings, nearly half (23 out of 58) of the model bills address some aspect of
parental choice, including homeschooling, charter schools, and voucher programs. As the titles
imply, the organization provides several policy avenues to create publicly funded subsidies for
private education. For example, the “Parental Choice Scholarship Program Act” provides a model
bill for a traditional voucher program, 26 while the “Great Schools Tax Credit Program Act” 27 and
16

See Anderson & Donchik, supra note 10.

17

See Common Cause, supra note 15 http://www.commoncause.org/issues/more-democracy-reforms/alec
/whistleblower-complaint/; see also ALEC Exposed, supra note 8 http://www.commoncause.org/issues/more-democracyreforms/alec/whistleblower-complaint/.
18

See Peter Roff, ALEC Wins Big in Ethics Case, U.S. News and World Report (Feb. 20, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2015/02/20/alec-exonerated-in-minnesota-ethics-case
[https://perma.cc/2H6U-3SK4].
19

See, e.g., Archives: Education / Model Policies, American Legislative Exchange Council (July 2, 2016),
https://www.alec.org /issue/education/model-policy/ [https://perma.cc/P837-QN4S].
20

See Common Cause, supra note 15; see also ALEC Exposed, supra note 8; Molly Jackman, ALEC’s
Influence Over Lawmaking in State Legislatures, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute (Dec. 6, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/alecs-influence-over-lawmaking-in-state-legislatures/
[https://perma.cc/X5QMXRBA].
21

See Gary Anderson & Donchik, supra note 10. See also Underwood & Mead, supra note 10; see also
Whisner, supra note 15.
22
Ellen Dannin, Privatizing Government Services in the Era of ALEC and the Great Recession, 43 U. Tol.
L. Rev. 503, 509 (2012).
23
See generally Franklin Barbosa, Jr., An Unfulfilled Promise: The Need for Charter School Reform in New
Jersey, 39 Seton Hall Legis. J. 359 (2015). See also Dannin, supra note 22; Underwood & Mead, supra note 10 at 51-52.
24

Archives: Education / Model Policies, American Legislative Exchange Council (July 2, 2016),
https://www.alec.org/issue/education/model-policy/ [https://perma.cc/P837-QN4S].
25

See Dannin, supra note 22 at 521-22.

26

Parental Choice Scholarship Program Act, American Legislative Exchange Council (July 22, 2015),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/the-parental-choice-scholarship-program-act-means-tested-eligibility/
[https://perma.cc/A7L3-W942].
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the “Education Savings Account Act” 28 accomplish the same goal through different funding
mechanisms. 29 In addition to these broadly applicable or universal programs, ALEC also
publishes model voucher bills for particular subgroups of students (e.g., the “Autism Scholarship
Program Act,” 30 the “Foster Child Scholarship Program Act,” 31 and the “Military Family
Scholarship Program Act” 32). This attention to market-based approaches to education is, of
course, consistent with ALEC’s mission to “advance the fundamental principles of free-market
enterprise [and] limited government.” 33
Table 1: ALEC Model Legislation by Topic
Topic

Model Bill Titles

Choice/
Vouchers/
Charters

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The Parental Choice Scholarship Program Act (Universal
Eligibility)
The Parental Choice Scholarship Program Act (Universal
Eligibility, Means-Tested Scholarship Amount)
The Parental Choice Scholarship Program Act (MeansTested Eligibility)
Military Family Scholarship Program Act
Foster Child Scholarship Program Act
Autism Scholarship Program Act
Special Needs Scholarship Program Act
Education Savings Account Act
Family Education Savings Account Act
The Great Schools Tax Credit Program Act (Scholarship Tax
Credits)
Open Enrollment Act
Course Choice Program Act
(cont. next page)

27

Great Schools Tax Credit Program Act, American Legislative Exchange Council (Jan. 1, 2005),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/the-great-schools-tax-credit-program-act-scholarship-tax-credits/
[https://perma.cc/ABJ8-Y3FT].
28
Education Savings Account Act, American Legislative Exchange Council (July 22, 2015),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/the-education-savings-account-act/ [https://perma.cc/6SN9-B8DR].
29

Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling: Examining Voucher
Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees. 42 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 703, 706 (2015) (discussion of the
similarities and differences between vouchers, tax credit scholarships, and education savings accounts).
30
Autism Scholarship Program Act, American Legislative Exchange Council (Amended Aug. 1, 2009),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/the-autism-scholarship-program-act/ [https://perma.cc/HXE9-D3JA].
31

Foster Child Scholarship Program Act, American Legislative Exchange Council (Aug. 1,
2009),https://www.alec.org/model-policy/the-foster-child-scholarship-program-act/ [https://perma.cc/7XB8-SGD2].
32

Military Family Scholarship Program Act, American Legislative Exchange Council (Amended Aug. 1,
2009), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/the-military-family-scholarship-program-act/ [https://perma.cc/WGU8-DHJS].
33
See Archives: Education / Model Policies, AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL (July
2, 2016), http://web.archive.org/web/20130609065805/http://www.alec.org:80/about-alec/ [https://perma.cc/P837-QN4S].
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Model Bill Titles
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Parent Trigger Act
Public Charter School Authorizing and Accountability Act
Public Charter School Operations and Autonomy Act
Charter School Growth with Quality Act
The Next General Charter Schools Act
Amendments and Addendum: The Next Generation Charter
Schools Act
Student and Family Fair Notice and Impact Statement Act
School Choice Directory Act
The Smart Start Scholarship Program
Resolution Supporting Homeschooling Freedom
Taxpayers’ Savings Grants Act

Teachers/Employees

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Great Teachers and Leaders Act
Teacher Quality Assurance Act
Teacher Choice Compensation Act
Teacher Quality and Recognition Demonstration Act
Student Protection Act
Quality Education and Teacher and Principal Protection Act
Alternative Certification Act
National Teacher Certification Fairness Act
Career Ladder Opportunity Act

Technology and
Learning

•
•
•

Statewide Online Education Act
Online Learning Clearinghouse Act
Resolution Adopting the 10 Elements of High-Quality
Digital Learning for K-12
Virtual Public Schools Act
Early Intervention Program Act
Neutrality and Integrity in Software Procurement Act
Student Futures Program Act

•
•
•
•
Accountability

•
•

•
•

Digital Teaching and Learning Plan
Student Data Accessibility, Transparency and Accountability
Act
Resolution in Support of Student-Centered Accountability
Systems
Assessment Choice Act
Student Achievement Backpack Act

•
•
•
•
•

The Civic Literacy Act
Environment Literacy Improvement Act
Founding Philosophy and Principles Act
Free Enterprise Education Act
The Innovation Schools and School Districts Act

•

Curriculum
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Model Bill Titles
•
•

Finance

•
•
•

The Public School Financial Transparency Act
Public Charter School Funding and Facilities Model
Legislation
The School Board Freedom to Contract Act
Resolution on Title 1 of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act
K-12 Efficiency Commission

Language

•
•

Dual Language Immersion Program
K-12 Technology-Based Reading Intervention for English
Learners Act

Omnibus Choice Plus

•
•

A+ Literacy Act
Indiana Education Reform Package

Other topics addressed by ALEC model bills include: a) school teachers and employees
(nine bills); b) technology and learning (seven bills); c) accountability (five bills); d) curriculum
(five bills); e) school finance (five bills); f) language learning (two bills). 34 Two bills propose
large multi-topic omnibus packages of measures that include some form of parental choice as well
as other school “reforms” (e.g., the “A+ Literacy Act” 35 and the “Indiana Education Reform
Package” 36). This varied group of model bills, too, evinces a commitment to limiting government
and to forging public/private partnerships that open opportunities for for-profit vendors to be
involved in the delivery of public education. For example, “[t]he School Board Freedom to
Contract Act encourages the establishment of public/private partnerships between school boards
and the private sector for outsourcing and delivery of ancillary services under the direction of
school boards, when said services/programs can be executed more efficiently and more costeffectively by the private sector.” 37
Underwood and Mead 38 provide a specific illustration of this model bill process. ALEC’s
Education Task Force created the “Virtual Public Schools Act.” 39 K-12, Inc., a corporate member
of ALEC with influence on the Education Task Force, had input into the production of the model
bill. 40 ALEC’s Tennessee members introduced a bill with language nearly identical to that of

34

Archives: Education / Model Policies, supra note 24.

35

A+ Literacy Act, American Legislative Exchange Council (Jan. 7, 2011), https://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/the-a-plus-literacy-act/ [https://perma.cc/3XXZ-VSH2].
36

Indiana Education Reform Package, American Legislative Exchange Council (Aug., 5, 2011),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/indiana-education-reform-package/ [https://perma.cc/LQN4-P7PV].
37
The School Board Freedom to Contract Act, American Legislative Exchange Council (Amended Dec. 1,
1999), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/the-school-board-freedom-to-contract-act/ [https://perma.cc/34QV-3DR3].
38

Underwood & Mead, supra note 10.

39

The Virtual Public Schools Act, American Legislative Exchange Council (JAN. 1, 2005),

HTTPS://WWW.ALEC.ORG/MODEL-POLICY/THE-VIRTUAL-PUBLIC-SCHOOLS-ACT/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/ME7G-NKWQ].
40

Underwood & Mead, supra note 10 at 52.
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ALEC’s model legislation. 41 The bill passed on a party line vote on June 16, 2011. 42 Following its
passage, K-12, Inc. received a no-bid contract to create the Tennessee Virtual Academy,
guaranteeing K-12, Inc. income of $5,300 per student upon enrollment. 43
ALEC also produces a document annually entitled the “Report Card on American
Education,” an examination of each state’s education policies in relation to ALEC’s core
principles. 44 The 20th edition of the report card was published on November 10, 2015. 45 The
National Education Policy Center (NEPC) also reviewed the 18th edition of the Report Card,
published in 2013, calling the research “shoddy.” 46 NEPC’s authors concluded “[t]he report’s
purpose appears to be more about shifting control of education to private interests than in
improving education.” 47 Despite the questionable methods behind ALEC’s annual Report Card on
American Education, it is widely used to support and reinforce ALEC’s educational agenda. 48 To
further illustrate the reach of ALEC’s influence, Vice President Mike Pence, once an active
member of ALEC, wrote the foreword for the 2014 Report Card on American Education. 49
Former presidential hopeful and governor of Wisconsin Scott Walker wrote the most recent
foreword for the ALEC’s Report Card on American Education. 50 Both Pence and Walker
applauded ALEC’s work and emphasized ideologically consistent legislation in their respective
states.
ALEC’s expansive influence on policymaking in many regards is synonymous with a
lobbying institution, a claim which ALEC itself denies. 51 In their 2014 analysis, Anderson and
Donchik explain:
ALEC represents a unique combination of “statework,” corporate lobbying, and think
tank. While ALEC is in many ways more in the tradition of a lobby group promoting
corporate interests in education, it provides a legally legitimate space for corporations to
41

Id.

42

Id. at 52-53.

43

Id. at 53.

44

See generally Archive: Report Card on American Education, American Legislative Exchange Council,
https://www.alec.org/periodical/report-card-on-american-education/ [https://perma.cc/9DKM-Q6SK].
45
Matthew Ladner, Report Card on American Education: Ranking State K-12 Performance, Progress and
Reform, American Legislative Exchange Council (2015), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/ 2015/11/

2015alecreportcardfinalweb-151110162215-lva1-app6891.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSW9-G89U].
46

Christopher Lubienski & T. Jameson Brewer, Review of Report Card on American Education: Ranking
State K-12 Performance, Progress, and Reform, National Education Policy Center (MAY 9, 2013),
http://nepc.colorado.edu/thinktank/review-report-card-ALEC-2013 [https://perma.cc/B425-4RC8].
47

Id.

48

See, e.g., Lara K. Omps, Holding Teachers Accountable and Rewarding Those Who Perform: Evaluating
a Performance-Based Pay System for West Virginia, 114 W. Va. L. Rev. 1053, 1055-56 (2012). See generally Patrick H.
Ouzts, School Choice: Constitutionality and Possibility in Georgia, 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 587 (2012).
49

Matthew Ladner & David J. Myslinski, Report Card on American Education: Ranking State K-12
Performance, Progress and Reform, American Legislative Exchange Council (2014), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads
/2015/12/19th_Report_Card.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5C9-QJA9].
50

Ladner, supra note 45.

51

Allison Boldt, Rhetoric vs. Reality: ALEC’s Disguise as a Nonprofit Despite its Extensive Lobbying, 34
Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 35, 61-62 (2012); see also Common Cause, SUPRA NOTE 15; Dannin, supra note 22; Kammer,
supra note 10 at 120; Roff, supra note 18.
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co-write (not merely influence) model bills that, in turn, insert a business and market
logic, discourse and ideology into the public sector, promoting both the financial and
52
ideological interests of the corporate sector.

In blurring the line between lobbying and policy-work, ALEC enables corporations to
have greater access and voice in legislation, effectively bypassing the democratic process of
governance. 53 Kammer writes,
Because partisan control varies by state, multistate advocacy efforts promise greater
likelihood of success than pursuing those goals at the federal level. This strategy offers
private interests not only more venues through which to pursue legislative change, but
also allows them to circumvent the heightened legislative and legal barriers that exist at
54
the federal level.

Boldt reaches similar conclusions about ALEC’s circumvention of deliberative
democracy, asserting that ALEC promotes the influence of private interests within the democratic
process. 55
Although ALEC’s legacy as a secretive organization has limited the research on its
practices, the past four years have enabled greater understanding of the work and reach of this
organization within education law and policy. ALEC has a significant impact on legislative
policies and in providing direct access for corporate interests to state legislators, leading
researchers to conclude that ALEC’s efforts undermine democratic participation in the legislative
process. 56 Less is understood, however, about ALEC’s role in other aspects of shaping
governmental policies, such as through judicial routes.
A. Amicus Briefs

Scholars have long recognized the power of the Supreme Court in setting policy for the
nation. 57 As special interest groups, including ALEC, expand their role in education politics, 58 it
is not surprising that they seek to persuade those that work in both legislative and judicial

52

Anderson & Donchik, supra note 10 at 348.

53

Id.; see also Underwood & Mead, supra note 10; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 10 at 1101; Kammer, supra

note 10 at 125.
54

See Kammer, supra note 10 at 137.

55

See Boldt, supra note 51 at 54-55.

56

See Joanne Barkan, Plutocrats at Work: How Big Philanthropy Undermines Democracy, 80 Soc. Res.
635 (2013) at 647-48; see also Boldt, supra note 51 at 58-60; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 10; see also Jackman, supra note
20; see also Kammer, supra note 10 at 120.
57
See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in
US Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC. REV. 807, 825 (2004); see also Thomas Hansford, The Dynamics of Interest
Representation at the US Supreme Court, 64 Pol. Res. Q. 749, 751-54 (2011); Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington,
Lobbyists Before the Court. 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1172, 1173 (1953); Lisa A. Solowiej & Paul M. Collins, Counteractive
Lobbying in the US Supreme Court, 37 Am. Pol. Res. 670, 673 (2009).
58

See Kammer, supra note 10 at 125; Tiina Itkonen, Politics of Passion:Collective Action from Pain and
Loss, 113 Am. J. Educ. 577 (2007); Janelle Scott, Christopher Lubienski & Elizabeth DeBray-Pelot, The Politics of
Advocacy in Education, 23 Ed. Pol’y 3, AT 6-7 (2009).
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systems. 59 There are multiple methods groups can take to shape judicial decisions, ranging from
pursuing court cases to influencing the election of judges. 60 The most common method of interest
group participation, however, is through amicus curiae briefs. 61
Amicus curiae briefs, Latin for “friend of the court,” are submitted by individuals or
groups that are not directly involved with a case, but are nonetheless interested in influencing the
outcome. 62 Amicus briefs may provide valuable information to a court that is not available
through other sources, such as background information on the case, the implications of potential
rulings, or an explanation of broader public opinion on the case. 63 Demonstrating the relevance
and power of amicus briefs, judges reference or directly quote some amicus briefs in their
opinions. 64 Justice Breyer, advocating for the inclusion of scientific knowledge to inform court
cases wrote, “In our Court, as a matter of course, we hear not only from the parties to a case, but
also from outside groups that file amicus curiae briefs. These briefs help us become more
informed, for example, about the relevant scientific ‘state of the art.’” 65 Further confirming the
value of amicus briefs to the Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor wrote, “These amicus briefs
invaluably aid our decision-making process and often influence either the result or the reasoning
of our opinions.” 66 Amicus briefs therefore play a significant role in shaping decisions of
appellate courts in both state and federal judicial systems, including the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although there are rules limiting amicus brief participation, the U.S. Supreme Court has
maintained an open-door policy on accepting briefs since the 1960s, resulting in a significant
increase in the number of briefs presented to the Court today. 67 For example, Collins observed
59

Scott, et al, supra note 58. For example, see the following amicus briefs in various education cases: Brief
for Amici Curiae Liberty Counsel and American Association of Christian Schools in Support of Petitioner, Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011) (No. 09-987), 2010 WL 3198845; Brief of American
Educational Research Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2925967; Brief of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and the National Association For The Advancement Of Colored People As
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 001779), 2001 WL 1638648.
60
See generally Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Wendy L. Martinek, Friends of the Circuits: Interest Group
Influence on Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals, 91 Soc. Sci. Q. 397 (2010).
61
Id. at 398; see also Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as
Political Symbolism, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 185, 192-208 (2009).
62

See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme
Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743 (2000) 743, 744.
63

Id. at 748; Simmons, supra note 61 at 207-09.

64

See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Lobbyists Before the US Supreme Court Investigating the Influence of Amicus
Curiae Briefs, 60 Pol. Res. Q. 55. 56 (2007); see also Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The
Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, 215, 229
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman, eds., 1999); Thomas G. Hansford, Lobbying Strategies, Venue Selection, and
Organized Interest Involvement at the US Supreme Court, 32 Am. Pol. Res. 170 (2004); James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme Court, 50 Pol. Res. Q. 365, 373 (1997) (Finding
that “amicus briefs were more likely to have arguments accepted by the Court if they reiterated information in the party
briefs” at 376).
65

Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 Judicature, 24, 26 (1998).

66

Sandra Day O’Connor, Henry Clay and the Supreme Court, 94 Register of the Kentucky Historical
Society 353, 360 (1996).
67

See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 62 at 765.
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that “amicus briefs are filed in almost every case the Court accepts.” 68 For any given case,
multiple amicus briefs may be submitted. For example, in Fisher v. University of Texas, 69 the
Supreme Court’s most recent case addressing race-conscious college admissions policies, nearly
100 interested parties submitted amicus briefs. The Supreme Court has made few changes to
amicus brief procedures over time, with the notable exception in 1997 of the addition of the
inclusion of a statement of interest for the parties involved in the brief. 70 Kearney and Merrill
explain:
Specifically, the amended rule now requires that each amicus brief disclose in the first
footnote on the first page of text “whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole
or in part,” as well as the identity of “every person or entity, other than the amicus
curiae, its members or its counsel, who made a monetary contribution to the preparation
71
or submission of the brief.”

Although the Court did not provide a rationale for the addition of the statement of
interest, Kearney and Merrill hypothesize that it enables the Court to evaluate potential bias in
submitted briefs. 72 As briefs almost always endorse a specific outcome, they are ultimately more
akin to tools for lobbyists, rather than neutral resources for justices. 73
Given the potential for amicus briefs to act as a lobbying tool, they play crucial roles for
both their representative organizations and the Court. For sponsoring interest groups, submitting a
brief gives the organization a voice in judicial decisions, enabling them to promote and lobby for
decisions in their favor. 74 Furthermore, some groups use amicus briefs to bolster their
membership by demonstrating their commitment and engagement in promoting a specific
political, legislative, and judicial agenda. 75 Hansford found the extent of press coverage correlated
with the quantity of amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, suggesting some organizations
submit amicus briefs to leverage media attention that could potentially bolster membership. 76
Amicus briefs therefore enable organized interests to not only promote their judicial agenda, but
also to reinforce their membership and status as a central player in policy matters.
For courts, amicus briefs serve both symbolic and functional roles. First, the open door
policy of amicus briefs enacted by the Supreme Court ensures that the courts retain democratic
participation. 77 “Specifically, amicus curiae participation provides symbolic reassurance of the
Court’s receptiveness to the norm of democratic inclusion.” 78 Second, amicus briefs help inform
68

See Collins, Friends, supra note 57 at 807.

69

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).

70

Kearney & Merrill, supra note 62 at 766.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 766-767.

73

See Collins, Friends, supra note 57 at ; see also Collins, Lobbyists, supra note 64 at 58; Thomas G.
Hansford, Information Provision, Organizational Constraints, and the Decision to Submit an Amicus Curiae Brief in a US
Supreme Court Case, 57 Pol. Res. Q. 219, 220 (2004).
74

See Collins, Lobbyists, supra note 64 at 55, 57; see generally Hansford, Dynamics, supra note 56.

75

SEE ALSO

See generally Hansford, Information, supra note 73; SEE GENERALLY Solowiej & Collins, supra note 57;
Hansford, Dynamics, supra note 57 at 751; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 61 at 824-25.
76

See Hansford, Information, supra note 73 at 8.

77

See Simmons, supra note 61 at 189-90.

78

Simmons, supra note 61 at 197.
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the court about social, political, and legal arguments that can further inform each parties’ case, as
well as the potential outcomes for affected parties. 79 Amicus briefs enable justices to make sound
decisions based on the insights presented from organized interests. Epstein and Knight compare
this functional role to that of lobbyists for legislators, as amicus briefs enable external groups to
shape judicial policy decisions through the information they present. 80 Epstein and Knight write:
We argue that organized interests - participating as amici curiae - play a role for justices
similar to that lobbyists play for legislators: they provide information about the
preferences of other actors, who are relevant to the ability of justices to attain their
primary goal-to generate efficacious policy that is as close as possible to their ideal
points. In other words, just as information permits legislators to make rational decisions,
81
so too does it enable justices to make choices to maximize their preferences.

One critical factor in the functional value of amicus briefs to the Court is their accuracy.
Despite the significance of briefs providing accurate information to the Court, less attention is
granted to briefs’ veracity, 82 whereas more attention is granted to the potential redundancy of
information. 83 According to SUPREME COURT RULE 37.1, “An amicus curiae brief which brings

79

See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in
US Supreme Court Litigation, 38 Law & Soc. Rev. 807-8 (2004); see also Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 64.
80

See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici
Curiae, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, 225-228 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman, eds., 1999).
81

Id. at 215.

82

See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in
US Supreme Court Litigation, 38 Law & Soc. Rev. 807, at 810 (2004); see also Simmons, supra note 61, at 209:
“Unlike other forms of evidence that have been presented and challenged throughout the litigation
process, evidence contained in amicus briefs is not subject to cross-examination or expert testimony
from either side. Amicus briefs lack the safeguards characteristic of other forms of evidence.
Parties, however, do receive the briefs and have the opportunity to respond or rebut information,
facts, and arguments contained in the briefs. Nonetheless, such a task may be unduly burdensome
and drain resources. Furthermore, amici, unlike the parties, do not have to work from a trial record
or preserve issues for appeal. These concerns, however, are mitigated via (i) disclosure requirements
under Supreme Court Rules to identify potential bias; (ii) the conservation of judicial resources via
information gathering; and (iii) the skill of the Justices and their clerks. In the absence of rules
restricting access, the Court has developed its own filtering mechanisms for analyzing amicus briefs
and, upon occasion, provided informal guidance to potential filers concerning the Court's (or
Justices') preferences. Ultimately, the usefulness of findings and arguments presented in amicus
briefs hinges on their adequate evaluation.”
83

Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 64. In a study of party and amicus briefs filed in the 1992 Supreme
Court term, the authors found:
“Amici submit supplemental information not contained in litigants' briefs 6 7. 3 percent of the time,
and they solely add new arguments in 25.1 percent of briefs. Amici, however, even more frequently
reiterate information presented by litigants. Almost 75 percent of briefs reiterate a party brief, and
32.7 percent only provide information that already appears in the party brief. Second, scholars
contend that the Court often adopts arguments that are unique to an amicus brief. Our findings show
that the Court's majority opinions often accept arguments found in amicus briefs, using information
from 54.2 percent of petitioner amicus briefs and 43.2 percent of respondent amicus briefs. Contrary
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relevant matter to the attention of the Court that has not already been brought to its attention by
the parties is of considerable help to the Court. An amicus brief which does not serve this purpose
simply burdens the staff and facilities of the Court and its filing is not favored.” There is evidence
that Justices use information and research from amicus briefs to shape their opinions. 84 However,
research that critically examines the accuracy, rigor or motivation behind amicus briefs, in
general, is limited.
Thus, it is clear that amicus briefs play a significant role as a lobbying tool for special
interest groups in the judicial process, yet there appear to be few safeguards to ensure these briefs
are accurate. Moreover, while much has been written to chronicle the organization’s model bill
strategy to influence state legislation, including education law, no existing research examines
ALEC’s attempts to influence education policy in the form of amicus briefs.
II.

ALEC’S PARTICIPATION AS AN AMICUS

Between 1993 and 2015, ALEC submitted 33 amicus briefs: 8 briefs submitted to State
Supreme Courts, 7 briefs submitted to U.S. Courts of Appeals and 18 briefs submitted to the U.S.
Supreme Court (See Appendix A for a list of all briefs). In thirteen of those briefs, the
organization filed as the sole amicus, while in the majority of briefs (20), ALEC was one of a
number of signatories to the brief (amici). It is also interesting to note that in some instances,
ALEC filed briefs at multiple stages in the process of a single case. For example, in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 85 ALEC first signed onto a brief filed on behalf of 15 organizations when the
dispute was pending before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 86 and subsequently submitted a
solo brief when the case advanced to the U.S. Supreme Court. 87 Likewise, ALEC filed a brief in
Horne v. Flores, 88 to persuade the Supreme Court to accept the appeal 89 and then submitted a
second brief to opine on the merits of the dispute once the Court granted the petition to hear the
case. 90 As such, the organization used the amicus curiae process to weigh in on a total of 29
cases.

to accepted understanding, however, the Court less frequently utilizes amicus briefs' arguments
when they exclusively add information not contained in the party's brief. Using a pro bit model, we
also show that this relationship between amici supplementing litigant briefs and the Court's use of
their arguments persists even after controlling for alternative explanations.” Id. at 382.
84
See, e.g., Erica Frankenberg & Liliana M. Garces, Use of Social Science Evidence in Parents Involved
and Meredith: Implications for Researchers and Schools, 46 Univ. Louisville L. Rev. 703 (2007); Liliana M. Garces,
Reflections on a Collaboration Communicating Educational Research in Fisher, 42 Educational Researcher 174 (2013);
Lisa A. Solowiej & Paul M. Collins, Counteractive Lobbying in the US Supreme Court, 37 Am. Pol. Res. 670, 675 (2009).
85

Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).

86

Brief for the Center for Education Reform et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, SimmonsHarris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 00-3055, 00-3060, 003063), 2000 WL 35553799.
87
Brief for the Center for Education Reform, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 WL 1480661.
88

Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).

89

Brief on Behalf of the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives v. Flores, 555 U.S. 1092, (2009) (No. 08-294), 2008 WL
4496603.
90
Brief on Behalf of the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08294), 2009 WL 526204.
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Of those cases, four cases and a total of seven briefs considered major issues affecting K12 public education, all of which culminated in U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Zelman v.
Simmons- Harris (the use of publicly funded vouchers for private school tuition), 91 Davenport v.
Washington Education Association (the power of teachers unions), 92 Ysursa v. Pocatello
Education Association (the power of teachers unions), 93 and Horne v. Flores, (funding for English
Language Learners). 94 Table 2 lists those briefs. Turning to the content of the briefs themselves,
analysis reveals variance in the way the organization presents itself and its interests to the court.
Table 2: Briefs filed in Four Major Education Cases

1

2

3

4

Case Name
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman

Year*
2000

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris

2001

Davenport v. Washington Education
Association

2006

Davenport v. Washington Education
Association
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association

2006

Speaker of the Arizona House of
Representatives v. Flores

2008

U.S. Supreme
Court

Horne v. Flores

2009

U.S. Supreme
Court

2008

Court
6th Circuit Court
of Appeals
U.S. Supreme
Court
U.S. Supreme
Court
U.S. Supreme
Court
U.S. Supreme
Court

Type of brief
Arguing merits
Arguing merits
Arguing for
court to accept
case
Arguing merits
Arguing merits

Arguing for
court to accept
case
Arguing merits

*year the brief was filed with the court
A. Variance in Description of the Organization

Consistent with SUPREME COURT RULE 37, which requires amici to “set out in the brief
the interest of the amicus curiae, the summary of the argument, the argument, and the
conclusion,” each amicus brief begins with a description of ALEC’s interests. 95 As explained
earlier, this statement allows judges and justices to put the arguments that follow into context and
to discern the perspective from which the brief is written. This requirement, coupled with the
general rule that attorneys act with “candor toward the tribunal,” 96 is intended to ensure that
jurists have available the necessary information to judge both the source and quality of the
91

536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002).

92

Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 180 (2007).

93
94
95
96

Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009).
557 U.S. 433, 438-39 (2009).
SUP. CT. R. 37
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
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arguments presented to the court.
Interestingly, however, ALEC’s statement of interest in the cases varies from brief to
brief, both in what ALEC includes in its description and what it omits. Table 3 captures some of
that variance and presents the patterns that appeared when examining all 33 briefs. Specifically,
trends emerged regarding the description of legislative membership, corporate membership, the
role of others and any references to ALEC’s legislative work. For example, ALEC routinely
describes itself as the “nation’s largest” “individual membership association of state legislators.” 97
However, it sometimes refers to itself as a nonpartisan organization (19), 98 while other times, it
describes itself as a bipartisan organization (11). 99
Table 3: ALEC’s Descriptions of the Organization in Amicus Briefs
Characteristics of the Organization

Number of Cases

Description of Legislative Members
· “nonpartisan”
· “bipartisan”
· “Democratic and Republican”
· No specific description*

19
11
1
2

Mention of Corporations/Private Sector
· “private”sector
· “private and corporate foundations”
· “large and small businesses”
· Only legislative members mentioned
· No specific description*

8
4
1
18
2

Mention of Others
· “general public”
· Federal government

10
7

Mention of Model Legislation
· Model bills mentioned
· A specific model bill described
(cont. next page)

4
5

97

See, e.g., Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (No. 13-485); Brief of the
American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Empresso Casino Joliet Corp. v.
Giannoulias, (2009) (No. 08-945); Brief of the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Department of Health and Human Services v. State of Florida, 2011 U.S. Briefs 393 (2012) (No. 11-398);
Brief on Behalf of the American Legislative Exchange Council and the Lawyers Democracy Fund as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Bartlett v. Strickland, 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 709 (2008) (No. 07-689).
98

See, e.g., Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08-294), 2009 WL 526204.
99
See, e.g., Brief for the Center for Education Reform, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 WL 1480661.
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Characteristics of the Organization

Number of Cases

(cont. from previous)
· Mention of “policy” or “policy development”
· No mention of model bills
· No specific description*

4
18
2

[Vol. 20.4

* In two briefs, ALEC was one of many signatories and interest statement applied
generally to all groups and did not include a specific description of ALEC.
In a little over half of the briefs (18), ALEC only discloses its legislative membership,
leaving the fact that the organization has corporate or private members unknown to the reader of
the brief. Even when the description includes some mention of the “private sector” or corporate
foundations, the interest of the amicus statements do not disclose that these entities are in fact
“members” of the organization. 100 Rather, the phrase is used in relation to the goal the
organization seeks to advance. For example, the most recent description to appear in a brief
submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court reads:
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is the nation’s largest nonpartisan
individual membership association of state legislators. It has approximately 2,000
members in state legislatures across the United States. ALEC works to advance limited
government, free markets and federalism at the state level through a nonpartisan publicprivate partnership of America’s state legislators, members of the private sector and the
101
general public.

Notice that the phrase used is “members of the private sector,” not “private sector
members of ALEC.”
Likewise, ALEC sometimes includes and sometimes omits from its description any
mention of its role in producing model bills. 102 Only nine cases contained any mention of model
bills; four of these briefs mention this legislative activity generally and five of those eight
described specific models bills impacted by the relevant case. Four other briefs, though not using
the term “model bill,” referenced ALEC’s development of “policy.” 103 The majority of briefs
(18/33) are completely silent about this major ALEC activity.
This variation is on display in the seven briefs related to the four education cases. As
with the pattern reviewed above for all briefs, regardless of the topic of the case, each ALEC
100
See Brief of Amici Curiae National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center et
al., Hickenlooper v. Kerr at 4a, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (No. 14-460).
101

Id.

102

Two 2009 briefs provide an example. The organization mentions its model bill activity in: Brief of the
American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v.
Giannoulias, 556 U.S. 1281 (2009) (No. 08-945), 2009 WL 527001. In contrast, no mention is made of this activity in:
Brief on Behalf of the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 1-2, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08-294), 2009 WL 526204.
103

See e.g., Brief on Behalf of the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 2, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives v. Flores, 555 U.S. 1092, (2009) (No. 08-294), 2008 WL
4496603. (U.S.).
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depiction submitted in an education case understates the role of private interest groups and instead
emphasizes its “nonpartisan” membership of state legislators. This is especially the case for
ALEC’s briefs in Horne v. Flores and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which exclude any discussion
of ALEC’s private interests altogether. 104 The amicus briefs submitted in Davenport and Ysursa
describe the structure of ALEC as a “public-private partnership between America’s state
legislators and concerned members of the private sector, the federal government, and the general
public,” 105 which, though accurate, appears to downplay the influence that corporations have
over ALEC’s policy and legal positions. Table 4 provides relevant excerpts from ALEC’s
statements of interest, as presented in each amicus brief submitted in an education dispute. The
table is organized according to each brief’s description of ALEC as an organization, its mission
and interest in the case. The bold font highlights similarities and differences across the four
Supreme Court briefs on the merits.
Table 4: Excerpts from Amicus Briefs Submitted in Education Cases

Organization

Zelman (2001)
Nation’s largest
bipartisan
association of
state legislators

Davenport (2006)
Nation’s largest
individual
membership
association of state
legislators, with
more than 2,400
members.

Ysursa (2008)
Nation’s
largest
bipartisan,
individual
membership
association of
state
legislators,
with 2,000
members.

Flores (2009)
Nation’s largest
non-partisan
individual
membership
association of
state legislators.
ALEC has
approximately
2,000 members in
state legislatures
across the United
States.

104
See, e.g., Id. at 1-2; Brief for the Center for Education Reform, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris at 1-2, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 WL
1480661.
105

Brief of American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657), 2006 WL 3309497; Brief
of Evergreen Freedom Foundation, American Legislative Exchange Council, and Independence Institute as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 1, Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (No. 07-869), 2008 WL
2367230.
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Zelman (2001)
To discuss,
develop, and
disseminate
public policies
that expand free
markets, promote
economic
growth, limit
government, and
preserve
individual liberty

Interests

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol20/iss4/2
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Davenport (2006)
To advance the
Jeffersonian
principles of free
markets, limited
government,
federalism, and
individual liberty,
through a
nonpartisan,
public-private
partnership
between America’s
state legislators
and concerned
members of the
private sector, the
federal
government, and
the general public.

Ysursa (2008)
To advance the
Jeffersonian
principles of
free markets,
limited
government,
federalism, and
individual
liberty,
through a nonpartisan,
public-private
partnership
between
America’s
state
legislators and
concerned
members of
the private
sector, the
federal
government
and the
general
public.

Flores (2009)
To advance
Jeffersonian
principles of free
markets, limited
government,
federalism, and
individual liberty.

ALEC and its
members have an
acute interest in this
case because of its
federalism
implications. ALEC
has created Task
Forces that draft
model legislation in
a wide variety of
fields to advance the
principles outlined
aboveFalse
The decision in this
case may determine
the permissible
scope of judicially
imposed constraints
(cont. next page)

ALEC’s Task
Forces have
approved sever
al model bills
that protect the
First
Amendment
rights of
workers
represented by
labor
organizations.

ALEC’s Resoluti
on on the Federal
Consent Decree
Fairness
Act (2006) sets
forth ALEC’s
firm belief “that
federal consent
decrees [should
be] narrowly
drafted, limited in
duration, and
respectful of state
and local interests
and policy
judgments.”. . .A
LEC’s Education
Principles state
(cont. next page)

ALEC AS A FRIEND OF THE COURT (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/7/2017 5:15 PM

ALEC AS A “FRIEND OF THE COURT” IN EDUCATION CASES

Zelman (2001)

Davenport (2006)
(cont. from
previous)
on legislative
freedom of action in
the States, including
any limitations on
state laws designed
to protect federal
constitutional rights.
The state legislators
who craft and then
seek to enact
ALEC’s model
legislation have a
particularly strong
interest in ensuring
that
misapprehensions of
federal
constitutional
principles do not
unduly constrain
state legislation that
is designed to
advance individual
freedom.
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Flores (2009)
(cont. from
previous)
its mission
concerning
public education:
“To promote
excellence in the
nation’s
educational
system by
advocating educat
ion reform
policies that
promote parental
choice and school
accountability,
consistent with
Jeffersonian
principles of free
markets and
federalism.”
ALEC members
hold leadership
positions in state
Senate and House
chambers, as well
as State
legislative
committees
for education, edu
cation finance
and
appropriations.
These legislators
must fulfill state
constitutional
obligations to
provide for a
public education
and a determine
how federal legal
requirements
shall be
satisfied. . .
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In terms of its membership, ALEC is described as “bipartisan,” 106 “nonpartisan” 107 and an
“individual membership association of state legislators.” 108 Each brief indicates the organization’s
membership is comprised solely of state legislators. ALEC’s mission is consistently characterized
as one that prioritizes “free markets, limited government, federalism and individual liberty.” 109
However, the description ends with these principles in both Zelman and Flores. Comparatively,
the briefs in Davenport and Ysursa include a statement regarding a “nonpartisan, public-private
partnership between America’s state legislators and concerned members of the private sector, the
federal government, and the general public.” 110 ALEC’s interests mirror the broad principles
outlined in its mission: federalism (Davenport), protection of “First Amendment rights of workers
represented by unions” (Ysursa); and judicial constraint upon the legislative process (Flores). No
specific interest was identified in Zelman. Although public-private partnerships are mentioned in
two of the briefs, the nature of corporate or private interests are not presented in any of the briefs.
From this table, it is evident that ALEC’s structure and interests are inconsistently
represented. This directly impacts the court’s ability to understand the motivations behind
ALEC’s positions and arguments.
B. ALEC’S Role in Case Law

Notably, in each of the education cases for which ALEC filed a brief, a majority of the
Court decided in favor of ALEC’s position, and in one instance directly referenced ALEC in the
majority decision.
Horne v. Flores, 111 a case involving funding for English Learners, had a long and
procedurally complicated legal history. In 2000, a federal district court ruled that the State of
Arizona’s funding for English Learners was arbitrary, thereby violating the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA). 112 To remedy this violation, the district court ordered the

106

Brief of American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657), 2006 WL 3309497.
107
Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08-294), 2009 WL 526204.
108
Brief of American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657), 2006 WL 3309497.
109

Brief of American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657), 2006 WL 3309497; Brief
of Evergreen Freedom Foundation, American Legislative Exchange Council, and Independence Institute as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 1-2, Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (No. 07-869), 2008 WL
2367230; Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 1-2, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08-294), 2009 WL 526204. Brief on Behalf of
the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1-2, Speaker of the Arizona
House of Representatives v. Flores, 555 U.S. 1092, (2009) (No. 08-294), 2008 WL 4496603.
110
Brief of American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657), 2006 WL 3309497; Brief
of Evergreen Freedom Foundation, American Legislative Exchange Council, and Independence Institute as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 1, Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (No. 07-869), 2008 WL
2367230.
111

557 U.S. 433 (2009).

112

Flores v. Arizona, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1239 (D. Ariz. 2000).
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state to address its funding for English Learners on a state-wide basis. 113 Following a series of
sanctions for failure to comply with the decision, the case found its way to the Supreme Court. In
the Flores amicus briefs, ALEC argued that prior consent decrees or settlement agreements
unnecessarily constrained legislators’ ability to meet the needs of their constituents. 114 As a part
of the statement of interest in the brief on the merits, ALEC argued that “ALEC’s Resolution on
the Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act (2006) sets forth ALEC’s firm belief ‘that federal
consent decrees [should be] narrowly drafted, limited in duration and respectful of state and local
interests and policy judgments.’” 115 The Court was persuaded by this argument and Justice Alito,
writing for the majority, cited both to ALEC’s Resolution on the Federal Consent Decree Fairness
Act and the organization’s amicus brief. 116 Justice Alito also referenced ALEC’s Report Card on
American Education in a footnote to support the notion that “increased funding alone does not
improve student achievement.” 117 While the Court agreed with ALEC’s assertions about the
scope of judicial authority when remedying a violation of federal law, it rejected ALEC’s second
assertion that compliance with the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and its requirement that
states measure the achievement of English Learners was sufficient. 118 Instead, the Court held that
compliance with the NCLB did not necessarily equate with compliance with the EEOA. 119 It is
also interesting to note that Flores, the decision where the evidence of ALEC’s direct influence
was most traceable, was also the case in which ALEC was the least forthcoming about its
interests.
In other cases, ALEC’s influence is less apparent. Nonetheless, it is helpful to examine
the arguments found in ALEC’s amicus briefs and draw comparisons to arguments that the Court
found most compelling in reaching its decisions.
Given ALEC’s agenda, it is not surprising that ALEC has participated in case law
addressing school choice. More specifically, ALEC signed onto a brief in Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, a case which involved a challenge to Ohio’s voucher program under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 120 Because 82% of participating schools were religiously
affiliated and 96% of the students in the program used the funding to attend religious schools, the
question before the Court was whether Ohio’s program had the effect of advancing religion in
violation of the First Amendment. 121 ALEC and other like-minded organizations argued that
“[a]llowing the federal courts to strike down voucher programs in their infancy simply because a
majority of students taking the cash option have chosen to attend religious schools will ensure that
virtually no voucher program will survive long enough so that its educational effects can be

113

Id.

114

See Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1a, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08-294), 2009 WL 526204; Brief
on Behalf of the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Speaker of the
Arizona House of Representatives v. Flores, 555 U.S. 1092, (2009) (No. 08-294), 2008 WL 4496603.
115

Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08-294), 2009 WL 526204.
116

Home, 557 U.S. at 449-50.

117

Id. at 464, n.17.

118

Id. at 462.

119

Id. at 462, 467.

120

536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).

121

Id. at 644, 647.
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measured—a result that is unsound as a matter of policy, as well as constitutionally incorrect.” 122
ALEC maintained that those challenging the program failed to meet their burden in demonstrating
that the program advanced religion, as required under Supreme Court precedent. 123 The Supreme
Court agreed, finding that the program was religiously neutral and promoted the genuine private
choice of individuals. 124
In light of ALEC’s legislative efforts pertaining to employees and unions, it is once again
not surprising that ALEC weighed in on cases discussing the use of union dues for the purpose of
political contributions. For example, Davenport v. Washington Education Association 125, involved
a Washington law that permitted the use of nonmember fees for election-related activities only
under circumstances where nonmembers expressly opt-in. 126 From ALEC’s perspective, the
“First Amendment operates here only to protect dissenters’ rights not to have the state force them
to fund political or ideological speech.” 127 The Court stated that the Washington Supreme Court
mistakenly understood prior case law to assert that objecting nonmembers bore the burden of
objecting to the use of fees for political purposes. 128 Although the Supreme Court did not directly
reference ALEC in its opinion, ALEC was undoubtedly pleased when the Court clarified that optout policies were the minimum and nothing prevented the State of Washington from enacting
policies that exceed the minimum standard. 129
ALEC presented its position in another union-related case, Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association. 130 The case involved an Idaho law 131 that allowed employees to choose to have a
portion of their wages deducted to pay union dues. However, employees were not permitted to
elect to have an amount used for the purpose of political activities. 132 ALEC argued that state
legislatures should be granted broad deference to address labor relations. Their brief stated that
“[n]o constitutional obligation on the state exists. . . to assist, recognize, or enhance a publicsector union’s status. Accordingly, states have adopted, and courts have upheld, numerous
restrictions on unions’ statutorily-conferred bargaining status.” 133 In support of ALEC’s position,
the Court determined that “The First Amendment prohibits government from ‘abridging the
freedom of speech’; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms
for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.” 134
122
Brief for the Center for Education Reform, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24, Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris at 1-2, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 WL 1480661.
123
124
125
126

Id. at 16-17.
Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 at 662.
See generally Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760 (1992) (current version at Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17A.550 (2012)).

127

Brief of Am. Legis. Exch. Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, Davenport v. Wash.
Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657), 2006 WL 3309497.
128

See Davenport, 551 U.S. at 185.

129

Id. at 185-86 (Referring to the court’s statement, “To the contrary, we have described Hudson as
‘outlin[ing] a minimum set of procedures by which a [public-sector] union in an agency-shop relationship could meet its
requirements under Abood.’ Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (emphasis added.)”).
130

See generally Ysura v. Pocatello Ed. Ass’n., 555 U.S. 353 (2009).

131

See generally Idaho Code Ann. § 44-2004.

132

Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009).

133

Brief of Evergreen Freedom Found., Am. Legis. Exch. Council, and Indep. Inst. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 3, Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (No. 07-869), 2008 WL 2367230.
134

Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 355.
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While it is interesting to examine those cases for which ALEC served as an amicus, there
are important education cases where ALEC did not file a brief when it might have been expected.
For example, given that ALEC encourages states to adopt tax credit scholarship programs, 135 one
might have anticipated that the organization would weigh in on the challenge to the Arizona tax
credit scholarship program when it reached the Supreme Court. 136 It did not. Likewise, given the
group’s activity in both Davenport 137 and Ysura, 138 it seems curious that the group did not
advance an opinion in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 139 a case that likewise
considered the bargaining rights of teachers unions. 140 Once again, however, it elected to abstain
from direct involvement.
Despite these anomalies, the amicus briefs reviewed for this study demonstrate that
ALEC is active in the judicial arena. The organization weighed in on four significant Supreme
Court decisions impacting education policy. In doing so, ALEC inconsistently characterized its
membership, mission and interests in its descriptions to the Court. Topically, funding for English
Learners, teachers unions and school choice appear to be consistent with the organization’s
agenda and ideology. Next we analyze these efforts in relation to principles of deliberative
democracy.
III. ANALYSIS
“In state legislatures around the country, citizen groups foster ideas, participate in
discussions and provide their points of view to lawmakers. This process is an important
141
part of American democracy.”

This quotation, taken from the 2015 Report Card on American Education, illustrates
ALEC’s recognition of the influence of its work on our democratic system of governance.
However, close inspection of ALEC’s activity as a “friend of the court” suggests that its efforts
undermine key elements of democracy.
As ALEC has sought to influence education policy through two sources of law –
legislation and case law – we use deliberative democracy as the conceptual lens through which to
view ALEC’s activities. Deliberative democracy is a political theory that posits that for
democratic government to work, citizens and their representatives must engage in a process of
deliberating the relative merits of a policy in order to rationalize its adoption. 142 As Gutmann and
135

See e.g., The Great Schools Tax Credit Program Act (Scholarship Tax Credits), AM. LEGIS. EXCH.
COUNCIL (n.d.), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/the-great-schools-tax-credit-program-act-scholarship-tax-credits/
[https://perma.cc/4RLU-MRJR].
136

See generally Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011).

137

See generally Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007).

138

See generally Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Assoc’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009).

139

Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 136 U.S. 1083 (2016).

140

The Supreme Court, being equally divided on the issues presented, affirmed the judgment in favor of the
teachers union regarding the propriety of agency or fair use fees charged to non-union members to compensate the union
for representing all teachers (union and non-union) in contract negotiations. Id.
141

Ladner, supra note 45 at 110.

142

See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004); Amy Gutmann &
Dennis F. Thompson, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1998). Gutmann and Thompson are among a number of scholars
to discuss deliberative democracy and in their 2004 volume they provide a review of the others’ work with the same
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Thompson explain:
[D]eliberative democracy [is] a form of government in which free and equal citizens
(and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another
reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching
conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the
143
future.

Deliberative democracy, therefore, combines both substantive and procedural principles
as necessary predicates to a functioning democracy 144 (See Figure 1, infra). Substantively, all
policies and the debates about them relate in some way to three general principles: (1) basic
liberty, (2) basic opportunity, and (3) fair opportunity. 145 Basic liberty refers to those ideals
enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution (e.g., freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, freedom from unreasonable searches, etc.). 146 Basic opportunity captures the idea that all
governmental actions seek to provide or to structure opportunity for its citizens, while the
principle of fair opportunity recognizes that all in the society must have access to the
opportunities created in order for democracy to thrive. 147 In order to ensure that deliberations on a
proposal are truly democratic, the deliberative process must likewise be characterized by three
features: (1) reciprocity, (2) publicity, and (3) accountability. 148 Reciprocity requires that those
engaged in debates provide reasons for their support or opposition that can be understood by all
and that evidence given be obtained by reasonable and recognizable forms of inquiry. 149 Publicity
refers to what may be also called transparency. That is, that debates occur in public and that
citizens have ample time to inform their representatives of their views and engage in the
process. 150 Finally, accountability refers to the principle that both citizens and their
representatives are responsible to each other for the policies adopted and for abiding by them.
Further, accountability in process provides a check when constituents believe their representative
is not adequately acting in their interests. 151 Courts, of course, also provide a means for holding
the system accountable when an individual or group alleges that policy makers have exceeded the
scope of their authority.

concept (See WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004), at 189, note 3). For the purposes of this discussion, we rely on
their view of the theory.
143

See Gutmann & Thompson (2004), supra note 142 at 7.

144

See Gutmann & Thompson (2004), supra note 142 at 23-6.

145

See Gutmann & Thompson (2004), supra note 142 at 137; Gutmann & Thompson (1998), supra note

146

See Gutmann & Thompson (2004), supra note 142 at 137.

147

Id.

148

Id. at 133.

149

Id.

150

Id. at 135.

151

Id.

142, at 8.
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Figure 1: The procedural and substantive principles of deliberative democracy

We first briefly examine ALEC’s work as an amicus in relation to the substantive
elements of deliberative democracy (basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity).
Though, as the analysis will show, the greatest impact of ALEC’s advocacy appears to be on the
procedural elements of deliberative democracy (reciprocity, publicity, and accountability).
A. Substantive Elements of Deliberative Democracy

It is not the intent of this study to debate the merits of the policy stances ALEC takes.
We acknowledge that some will view ALEC’s positions positively and some will not. That said,
it is interesting to note both the consistencies and contradictions in the substantive arguments
ALEC made to the Court, particularly in relation to the organization’s espoused goals and to the
substantive elements of basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity.
The organization characterizes one of its primary goals to be the championing of the
“Jeffersonian principle [] . . . of individual liberty.” 152 As such, the organization often evokes
liberty interests in its arguments. For example, in its brief in Davenport v. Washington Education
Association, ALEC characterized the legal issue as follows: “Can a State that provides for union
security contracts also impose innovative conditions that protect the expressive rights of

152

Membership, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (n.d.), https://www.alec.org/membership/ [https://perma.cc/

X5P4-X87E].
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nonmembers who are coerced into paying a union to represent them?” 153 Likewise, two years
later it advised the Court in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association that the matter before it
required the justices to find “the desired balance of protecting the First Amendment rights of both
workers and unions in the context of a collective bargaining agreement.” 154 In both instances,
ALEC argued for what it characterized as the individual rights of union non-members, while
discounting the basic liberties (association, speech, and petition) afforded and amplified by
collective action. In addition, it is ironic that that an organization dedicated to smaller
governmental control argued that state legislators should have the authority to set statewide
policies that limit the authority of local policy makers to manage their own employee relations.
By adopting that perspective, ALEC’s argument chose the side of state-level officials, whether or
not they are in a better position than local school board members to discern where the balance
should rest between any tension of rights that may arise between an individual teacher and a union
that represents that class of employees.
This expansion of state authority at the expense of local authority illustrated in
Davenport and Ysursa is also apparent in some of the model bills disseminated by ALEC. For
example, the Teacher Quality Assurance Act “prohibits a school district from utilizing a lasthired, first-fired layoff policy when reducing staff.” 155 If enacted, this model legislations limits
the discretion of local policy-makers to weigh the merits and demerits of such a policy in their
local community. Another way the authority of local elected school boards is diminished is
through some of the model bills related to charter schools, such as the Next Generation Charter
Schools Act. 156 This model bill outlines legislation that gives authority to create new public
charter schools to state-wide, non-elected entities rather than local school boards. 157
Another substantive aspect of deliberative democracy is basic opportunity. ALEC’s
advocacy for parental choice highlights the opportunities created by such policies. ALEC cast its
support of the publicly funded private school vouchers in Zelman as “an innovative attempt by the
State to utilize the private education market to help satisfy its obligation under State constitutional
law to provide an adequate educational program for all of Cleveland’s children.” 158 ALEC’s
approach also focuses on the state legislature as the body best suited to craft basic opportunities.
In Flores, the organization’s critique of the judicial decree as an over-reach of authority contends
that legislatures, not judges, are in the best position to discern how to provide the basic
opportunity afforded through education. 159
153
Brief of Am. Legis. Exch. Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, Davenport v. Wash.
Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657), 2006 WL 3309497. (stating, “This Balkanization of labor
relations will undermine a state’s ability to achieve the desired balance of protecting the First Amendment rights of both
workers and unions in the context of a collective bargaining agreement.”).
154
Brief of Evergreen Freedom Found., Am. Legis. Exch.e Council, and Indep. Inst. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 27-28, Yusra v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (No. 07-869), 2008 WL 2367230.
155

Teacher Quality Assurance Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (n.d.), https://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/teacher-quality-assurance-act/ [https://perma.cc/D5WR-Y2P4].
156

See The Next Generation Charter Schools Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (July 28, 2016),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/amendments-and-addendum-the-next-generation-charter-schools-act/
[https://perma.cc/X3CQ-CVZC].
157

See id.

158

Brief for the Center for Education Reform, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 25, Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 WL 1480661.
159

Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 26-28, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08-294), 2009 WL 526204. “In short,
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However, democracy necessitates that opportunities also be fair and equally accessible.
What is “fair,” of course, is often a matter of perspective. As such, both concerned citizens
considering the merits of a model bill and judges trying to weigh the advice of an amicus need to
know the provenance of the idea in order to ascertain its fairness. As will be discussed more
thoroughly in the next section, ALEC’s selective disclosure of its membership and the interests it
represents compromises the ability of anyone trying to discern the fairness of its arguments.
ALEC also consistently insists upon a limited role for the judiciary, which seems to
overlook the role courts play in ensuring fair opportunities. In its brief for Horne v. Flores, ALEC
titled a subsection “Frustrated Political Factions Can Improperly Use Institutional Reform
Litigation to Circumvent the Legislative Appropriations Process.” 160 Specifically, ALEC argues
that the lower court’s ruling in Horne v. Flores “has enabled a particular political faction to
circumvent the appropriations process entirely, and instead pursue its political agenda through the
federal courts.” 161 ALEC portrays individuals seeking court intervention in an effort to protect
federal statutory and constitutional rights as special interest groups. In that way, ALEC ignores
the role courts play in ensuring that the opportunities provided by our democracy are equitably
available. 162 Ironically, ALEC’s organizational structure allows for political factions, which are
undisclosed for-profit entities, to circumvent the legislative process by giving priority to unknown
financial beneficiaries of the laws rather than those children who should be the true beneficiaries
of education legislation.
On a related note, ALEC consistently champions the cause of separation of powers,
arguing that “Public Education Is Properly the Domain of State Policymakers—Not Federal
Courts.” 163 In fact, ALEC dedicated a whole section of a brief to this idea. To take this argument
to its logical conclusion would render ALEC’s approach to enacting legislation wholly
inappropriate. Employing this logic, if public education is primarily the domain of state and local
policymakers, those closest to the communities served by the policies are best positioned to
identify needs and solutions to those needs. Private, for-profit entities that pursue their vested
interests by contributing to the production of model bills are distant, not embedded in the
communities ultimately impacted by the legislation. And yet, ALEC presents the model bills as
solutions for every context, which seems to run counter to its approach to ensuring education
policy is enacted in the proper “domain.”

the Ninth Circuit has allowed the District Court to further its own educational agenda by inserting itself into an education
policy dispute between the political branches of Arizona. This Court’s long-standing precedent simply does not allow the
federal courts to override state and local control of education absent a current and ongoing violation of federal law. As
discussed below, it is ALEC’s firm belief that to allow otherwise is both improper and inefficient, and ultimately will
severely undercut the ability of Arizona’s schools to best educate their ELL students.” Id., at 28 (internal citation omitted).
160

Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 19, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08294), 2009 WL 526204.
161

Id. at 6.

162

See e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregated schools created
inherently unequal educational opportunities); Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia, 348 F.Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972) (holding that children with disabilities could not be excluded from public schools); Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that children not fluent in English must be provided with equal educational opportunities); Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that states may not deny access to public educational opportunities to the children of
undocumented persons).
163

Id. at 26.
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B. Procedural Elements of Deliberative Democracy

The briefs reviewed in this study relied upon principles such as democratic
accountability, federalism and separation of powers. The briefs reviewed in this study relied upon
ALEC’s espoused principles of democratic accountability, federalism and separation of powers.
Cross-referenced with the procedural elements of deliberative democracy—reciprocity,
accountability and publicity—each of these principles will be analyzed to illustrate the
implications of ALEC’s arguments and overall lack of transparency.
Recall that reciprocity refers to the arguments made when debating the rationale for a
policy and that those engaged in the debate rely on evidence obtained in reasonable and
recognizable forms. To support its argument in favor of federalism in its Flores brief, ALEC
referenced one of its own articles, which stated that “[c]arefully designed local programs
specifically tailored to solve community problems should not be displaced in favor of one-sizefits-all federal formulas.” 164 This argument is inconsistent with ALEC’s one-size-fits-all
promulgation and dissemination of model legislation. According to an archived version of
ALEC’s website,
ALEC’s National Task Forces provide a forum for legislators and the private sector to
discuss issues, develop policies and write model legislation. In the legislative sessions of
1996, there were 639 introductions which followed ALEC models. Of these, 132 were
165
enacted, for a passage rate of more than 20 percent.

While many organizations use model legislation as a tool to guide policy change, the
origin of ALEC-inspired legislation is unknown to the public. Instead, model legislation,
sometimes verbatim, is proposed by legislators from states across the county, at the expense of
“community problems” and for the benefit of corporate entities. Similarly, when ALEC omits
corporate members from its description of the organization and fails to acknowledge such
members’ influence in the production of the policies it advocates, ALEC hampers the reciprocal
relationship any amicus curiae enters when advising the justices on a pending dispute.
Relatedly, although ALEC sometimes refers to its inclusion of “concerned members” of
the “general public” in its statement of interest, it is difficult to determine where public interests
are considered. According to ALEC’s website,
[w]ith over 2,000 members, ALEC is the nation’s largest nonpartisan, individual
membership association of state legislators. ALEC is one of America’s most dynamic
public-private partnerships with nearly 300 corporate and private foundation members.
ALEC provides its public and private sector members with a unique opportunity to work
together to develop policies and programs that effectively promote the Jeffersonian
166
principles of free markets, limited government, federalism, and individual liberty.

164
Id. at 8 (referencing Benjamin Barr, The States’ Struggle for Sovereignty: The Consequences of Federal
Mandates, ALEC Policy Forum (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.alec.org/am/pdf/apf/apf_federal_mandates.pdf).
165

About ALEC (1998), American Legislative Exchange Council, https://web.archive.org/web/

19981212022635/http://www.alec.org/ [https://perma.cc/26MM-RHDB].
166
See Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08294), 2009 WL 526204.
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This structure and process appears to neglect public participation and access.
In Ysursa, ALEC emphasized the importance of granting deference to state officials to
make state-wide determinations regarding the power of unions under state law. 167 ALEC’s
argument is misleading in that ALEC’s structure encourages democratically elected officials to
defer to corporate interest groups, rather than the interests of those individuals whom they are
elected to represent. ALEC’s argument in Ysursa also relied on the fact that “every state has set
up a system suited to its particular public employment climate,” 168 an outcome that ALEC’s
approach to uniform model legislation undermines.
A fully functioning democracy also demands publicity so that all may judge the origin of
any policy and gauge the persuasiveness of the arguments for and against it. Central to the notion
of publicity is the concept of transparency, so that all engaged in the process can clearly assess the
perspective of those trying to persuade them.
As illustrated in the earlier discussion, ALEC inconsistently characterizes its
membership as either bipartisan or non-partisan. This variance does not correspond to
chronological order of its filings or evolution within the organization. In fact, in a brief submitted
on February 26, 2009, the organization described itself as “non-partisan,” 169 but submitted a brief
one day later on February 27, 2009 describing itself as “bipartisan.” 170
Neither word seems to accurately portray the nature of ALEC. Bipartisan is defined as
“of, relating to, or involving members of two parties,” while non-partisan is defined as “free from
party affiliation, bias, or designation. 171 However, as others have observed, ALEC’s membership
is overwhelmingly Republican and its policy stances align with those of the Republican Party. 172
In fact, the last six editions of the Report Card on American Education have included forwards
from Republican politicians including: William Bennet, 173 Jeb Bush, 174 Mitch Daniels, 175 Mary
Fallin, 176 Mike Pence, 177 and Scott Walker. 178
167

See Brief for Evergreen Freedom Foundation, American Legislative Exchange Council, and
Independence Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 555 U.S. 353
(2009) (No. 07-869), 2008 WL 2367230.
168

See id. at 28.

169

Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08294), 2009 WL 526204.
170
Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias, 556 U.S. 1281 (2009) (No. 08-945).
171

See “Bipartisan”, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/bipartisan[https://perma.cc/3AN6-SEJ8] (7 Aug. 2016); See “Nonpartisan”, Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nonpartisan [https://perma.cc/5W6S-YLSP] (7 Aug. 2016).
172

See Anderson & Donchik, supra note 10; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 10; see also Kammer,
supra note 10; see also Underwood & Mead, supra note 10.
173
Report Card on American Education: A State-by-State Analysis 15th Edition, American Legislative
Exchange Council (2008), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2015/12/15th_Report_Card.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RVDRTS6].
174

Report Card on American Education: A State-by-State Analysis 16th Edition, American Legislative
Exchange Council (2010), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2015/12/16th_Report_Card.pdf [https://perma.cc/94VUHE5Z].
175
Report Card on American Education: A State-by-State Analysis 17th Edition, American Legislative
Exchange Council (2012), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2015/12/17th_Report_Card.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZATFP9V].
176

Report Card on American Education: A State-by-State Analysis 18th Edition, American Legislative
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Not only are the descriptions inconsistent with regard to the nature of the organization,
but they also inconsistently describe the role of its corporate membership and its production and
dissemination of model bills. Interestingly, while the interest statements in its amicus briefs
appear to downplay ALEC’s role in the articulation and adoption of legislation, the statements in
its education report cards do just the opposite, lauding both the access to corporate leaders and the
creation of model bills. For example, in ALEC’s 2001 Report Card on American Education,
released the same year the Zelman brief was submitted, ALEC stated that:
Each [Task Force] provides a unique vehicle for legislators to communicate across state
lines, share experiences and ideas, and work in unison with the private sector to develop
policies and write model legislation. ALEC’s goal is to ensure that our legislative
members are fully armed with the information, research and ideas they need to win in the
legislative arena. Our publications keep members up-to-date on emerging trends and
provide in-depth analyses of issues at the state level. Our conferences promote colleague
to colleague communication by linking like-minded legislators together. ALEC provides
the private sector with an unparalleled opportunity to have their voices heard and their
perspectives appreciated. Through ALEC, legislators and the private sector work in a
dynamic partnership to develop public policies that harness the immense power of free
markets and free enterprise to encourage economic growth, increase the nation’s
179
competitiveness, and improve the quality of life for all Americans.

In the case of ALEC, accountability is closely tied to publicity. ALEC’s lack of
transparency makes it difficult for citizens to hold its legislative and corporate members
accountable. The accountability that exists within ALEC’s organizational structure is between its
legislative and corporate members. As illustrated in the quotation above, corporations have an
“unparalleled opportunity to have their voices heard and their perspectives appreciated.”
Corporations associated with ALEC have a clear financial interest in the adoption of ALEC’s
model legislation. Moreover, these corporations, which directly benefit from legislation the way
that K-12, Inc. did in Tennessee, proceed to reinvest a portion of their profit in the form of ALEC
membership fees.
However, both the model bill cycle and the limited disclosure of organizational interests
hinder publicity and accountability. If citizens are not aware of the corporate interests that may
benefit from passage of a model bill, they are robbed of their ability to fully vet the idea as part of
the democratic process. Likewise, if ALEC provides only a partial disclosure of the nature of its
interests, judges are denied the opportunity to decide whether or not there is bias present.
In Horne v. Flores, ALEC begins its brief by summarizing the purpose of its argument,
which is “to reverse the lower courts’ rulings, and by so doing vindicate principles of federalism,
Exchange Council (2013), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2015/12/18th_Report_Card.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL5UEBG6].
177

Report Card on American Education: A State-by-State Analysis 19th Edition, American Legislative
Exchange Council (2014), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2015/12/19th_Report_Card.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZMER7ZX].
178
Report Card on American Education: A State-by-State Analysis 20th Edition, American Legislative
Exchange Council (2015), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2015/11/2015alecreportcardfinalweb-151110162215-lva1app6891.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKG9-TZKW].
179
American Legislative Exchange Council, REPORT CARD ON AMERICAN EDUCATION: A STATE-BY-STATE
ANALYSIS, at 41976-2001 (2002).
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separation of powers, and democratic accountability, and ultimately restore control over
Arizona’s educational system to the state and local authorities best suited to educate Arizona’s
youth.” 180 However, ALEC’s structure thrives on a lack of democratic accountability. From the
secrecy of its membership and leadership structure to the privacy of its model legislation, lack of
transparency has been an integral part of ALEC’s design.
IV. CONCLUSION

It is not surprising that an organization with an interest in educational policy formation
would attempt to influence legal proceedings. This article demonstrates that ALEC has actively
used the amicus curiae brief process in four major education cases heard by the U.S. Supreme
Court to assert some influence on judicial policy review. However, ALEC’s overall lack of
transparency hinders the judiciary’s ability to sift through ALEC’s legal arguments. Any group
that seeks to sway opinion in both legislative and judicial spheres bears watching. Accordingly, it
is important for judges, researchers, policy makers and practitioners to keep ALEC’s work on
their radar. Armed with all necessary information, individuals representing each of these groups
may choose to support ALEC’s position. However, the process through which this decision is
reached is significant. Access to information and deliberation is necessary to promote democracy.
We believe ALEC has as much right to a seat at the table of any policy debate as any other entity,
whether that debate takes place in a state house or a court house. But when it takes a seat, either as
a friend of the court or as the author of a model bill, everyone should have a full understanding of
ALEC’s membership and the interests, corporate and otherwise, the organization represents.

180
Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08294), 2009 WL 526204.
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APPENDIX – CITATIONS FOR ALL BRIEFS FOR WHICH ALEC SERVED AS AN AMICUS
CURIAE
Briefs filed in US Supreme Court
1. Brief for National Federation of Independent Business, Tabor Foundation, American Legislative
Exchange Council, National Taxpayers Union, Americans for Tax Reform, Citizens in Charge,
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, Citizens for Limited Taxation, Goldwater Institute,
Freedom Center of Missouri, Cascade Policy Institute, Pelican Institute for Public Policy, Tax
Foundation of Hawaii, Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Washington Policy Center as Amici
Curiae, Hickenlooper v. Kerr, 135 S.Ct. 2927 (2015) (No. 14-460), 2014 WL 6657598.
2. Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485), 2014 WL
4804048.
3. Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Overstock.com, Inc., v. New York State Department of Taxation And Finance et al., 134 S.Ct. 682
(2013) (Nos. 13-252 and 13-259) 2013 WL 5316717.
4. Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, National Federation of Independent Business, et al., v. State of Florida, 132 S.Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 504620.
5. Brief for American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4099519.
6. Brief for New England Legal Foundation Associated Industries of Massachusetts Associated
Industries of Vermont Maine Merchants Association and American Legislative Exchange Council
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 557 U.S. 936 (2009) (No.
08-1202), 2009 WL 1155410.
7. Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias, 556 U.S. 1281 (2009) (No. 08-945), 2009 WL
527001.
8. Brief on the American Legislative Exchange Council and Certain Individual State Legislators as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (No. 08-294), 2009
WL 526204.
9. Brief on Behalf of the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives v. Flores, 555 U.S. 1092, (2009) (No.
08-294), 2008 WL 4496603. (U.S.)
10. Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council and The Lawyers Democracy Fund as Amici
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Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (No. 07-689), 2008
WL 3874280.
11. Brief for Evergreen Freedom Foundation, American Legislative Exchange Council, and
Independence Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (No. 07-869), 2008 WL 2367230.
12. Brief for American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent,
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 317756.
13. Brief for American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (Nos. 05-1589, 05-1657),
2006 WL 3309497.
14. Brief for Evergreen Freedom Foundation and Twelve Leading Public Policy Organizations as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 548 U.S. 942
(2006) (No. 05-1657), 2006 WL 2401857.
15. Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council and Free Enterprise Coalition as Amici Curiae
in Support of Appellees, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)
(Nos. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276, 05-439), 2006 WL 247771.
16. Brief for the American Homeowners Alliance, American Legislative Exchange Council, Americans
for Technology Leadership, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Consumer Alert, eBay, Inc.,
Information Technology Association of America, Internet Commerce Coalition, NetChoice,
Pacific Research Institute, the Progress & Freedom Foundation, Software & Information Industry
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005)
(Nos. 03-1116, 03-1120), 2004 WL 2155306.
17. Brief for the Center for Education Reform, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 WL 1480661 .
18. Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation and American Legislative Exchange Council as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Speroni,
525 U.S. 922 (1998) (No. 97-2063), 1998 WL 34102849.

Briefs filed in US Courts of Appeals
1. Brief for the National Federation of Independent Business, Tabor Foundation, American Legislative
Exchange Council, National Taxpayers Union, Americans for Tax Reform, Citizens in Charge,
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, Citizens for Limited Taxation, Goldwater Institute,
Freedom Center of Missouri, Cascade Policy Institute, Pelican Institute for Public Policy, Tax
Foundation of Hawaii, Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Washington Policy Center as Amici
Curiae, Kerr v. Hickenlooper, —- F. 3d —- (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 12-1445), 2015 WL 4642371.
2. Brief of the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, The
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State of Tennessee v. Federal Communications Commission, No. 15-3291, 2015 WL 5693407 (6th
Cir., September 25, 2015).
3. Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council As Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellees, State of Florida v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th
Cir. 2011)(Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067), 2011 WL 2530504.
4. Brief for the Center for Education Reform et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants,
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F. 3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 00-3055, 00-3060, 00-3063), 2000
WL 35553799.
5. Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation, American Legislative Exchange Council, and Rep.
George N. Katsakiores (New Hampshire), Rep. Howard L. Fargo (Pennsylvania), Assemblyman
Clifford W. Crouch (New York) as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, National
Foreign Trade Council v. Laskey, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2304), 1999 WL 33911644.
6. Brief for American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), The Empowerment Network Foundation
(TENF), the Independent Women’s Forum (IWF), and three individual recipients of AFDC in New
Jersey: Bethsai Townsend, Tomikka Simmons, and Nicole Green as Amici Curiae in Opposition to
Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Appeal, C.K. v. New Jersey Department of Health and Human Services, 92
F.3d 171 (3rd Cir. 1996) (No. 95-5454), 1995 WL 17170798.
7. Brief for the Citizens for A Sound Economy Foundation, American Legislative Exchange Council,
and Competitive Enterprise Institute as of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Company, et al., United States of America v. The Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company of Virginia, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 93-2340, 93-2341), 1993 WL
13122286.
Briefs filed in State Supreme Courts
1. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, National Asssociation of
Manufacturers, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center,
American Tort Reform Association, American Insurance Association, American Chemistry
Council, and American Legislative Exchange Council as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 126 Nev. 606, 245
P.3d 1182 (Nev. 2010) (No. 49207), 2010 WL 8534179.
2. Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae, Schnall v. AT&T Wireless
Services, Inc., 163 Wash.2d 1022, 185 P.3d 1194 (Wash. 2008) (No. 80572-5), 2008 WL 6194030.
3. Brief for the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d
310 (Wash. 2009) (No. 81287-0), 2008 WL 4727762.
4. Brief for the Washington Coalition for Open Government and the American Legislative Exchange
Council as Amici Curiae, Washington State Farm Bureau Federation v. Gregoire, 174 P.3d 1142
(Wash. 2007) (No. 78637-2), 2006 WL 3910766.
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5. Brief of the American Legislative Exchange Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants,
Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162 (Ky. 2006) (Nos. 2005-SC-603-TG (2005-CA-1601MR), 2005-SC-604-TG (2005-CA-1602-MR), 2005-SC-645-TG (2005-CA-1643-MR)), 2005 WL
5406234.
6. Brief for the Association of Commerce and Industry of New Mexico and the American Legislative
Exchange Council as of Amici Curiae, Hovet v. Allstate Insurance Company, 89 P.3d 69 (N.M.
2004) (Nos. 27,969, 28,009), 2003 WL 24287347.
7. Brief for the American Tort Reform Association, National Association of Manufacturers, and
American Legislative Exchange Council as of Amici Curiae in Support of Relators, In re
Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, L.L.C., cert. denied (Tex. 2003) (No. 02-0944), 2003
WL 22330742.
8. Brief for the National Conference of Insurance Legislators and the American Legislative Exchange
Council as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 835 N.E.2d
801 (Ill. 2005) (No. 91494), 2002 WL 33000648.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

